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3Executive summary
The rule of law question will most likely become 
a central EU issue during the mandate of the new 
European Commission. Member states are increasingly 
beginning to question, attack and/or ignore previously 
agreed common policies, political priorities or  
common principles. These challenges are usually  
more political – sometimes even ideological – than  
legal, thus the Commission’s legalistic reactions are  
not necessarily adequate. 
The Commission’s attempt to monitor and evaluate 
domestic situations with its own rule of law mechanism 
has two faults: the mechanism is not formally shared 
across EU institutions; and when it comes to its endgame 
of launching the Article 7 procedure, it is weakened by its 
hybrid nature. In other words, the mechanism is based 
on legal starting points, but the follow-up largely takes 
place on political and thus to some extent subjective 
grounds. When the original Commission mechanism was 
created, all of the possible consequences were not fully 
taken into account. In reality, it has alienated the targeted 
countries without achieving any real change in their 
conduct. Furthermore, while the Commission sought to 
place member states that supposedly breached certain 
commonly agreed principles and values under public 
pressure, it was the College that was forced to follow a 
predetermined path in the end. This did not serve the 
Commission’s interests nor achieve its original goal, since 
triggering the so-called nuclear option (i.e. Article 7) 
became unavoidable.
No rule of law mechanism can function effectively 
on legal grounds alone as long as the existing Treaty 
foundations are too ambiguous for this purpose and 
the final decision is taken at the political level where the 
Guardian of the Treaties is not the decisive player. The 
Treaty gave the Commission the right of notification 
and initiation, while judgement and decision are left 
solely to the member states. In theory, either the legal 
foundations in rule of law cases should be detailed 
enough so that they are sufficient for any final legal 
judgement, or the political nature of the question should 
be declared openly to invite all political players to 
contribute to the debate. Neither of these two options 
can materialise alone.
The Commission should avoid pretending that the 
College is the key to solving national challenges to 
the rule of law, given that it is not the decisive political 
player. This does not mean that the rule of law question 
should be put aside. Nevertheless, it is essential to 
respect the bounds of the Commission’s competence 
when handling cases of this kind and act accordingly. 
The Commission should also ensure that it does not 
serve just one part of the Community if it wishes to 
cooperate with all member states. The argument of 
the criticised member(s) also has its own logic and 
represents real interests and public support. Perhaps 
their conviction seems a of different world, but as long 
as that world is also formally part of the Community, it 
merits attention and analysis. Otherwise, any dialogue 
among Community members is bound to fail. The 
warning system itself should be improved, and the 
role of the Council updated. Considering sanctions, 
it may be wiser to stick to procedures that can be 
implemented to produce concrete results.
If the root of the rule of law question is primarily 
political, then one must face the reality that political 
disagreement is to be answered by political means – if 
at all. The new Commission will be confronted with 
a difficult choice: it can either try to live with all of 
those who are formally part of the Union mediating 
between them while continuing to defend the rules 
and values it is entrusted with as the Guardian of the 
Treaty. Alternatively, it can lead an open political fight 
against those who appear to weaken the previously 
agreed interpretation of fundamental European 
rules and principles. The first option gives preference 
to unity, while the second openly declares a split within 
the Community. However, there is also a third option: 
while not giving up on unity, likeminded and willing 
EU countries can intensify their level of integration 
while leaving others out of this closer cooperation, 
while all parties formally remain within the framework 
of a larger (and looser) Community.
The rule of law question in a politicised EU
When Ursula von der Leyen presented her priorities to 
the European Parliament’s plenary in mid-July 2019 as a 
candidate for the European Commission presidency, one 
of her promises was to pay close attention to the respect 
of the rule of law in the EU.1 A majority of the Parliament 
understood this to be a strong commitment to defend 
the rule of law in all member states and join the recent 
efforts of the outgoing Commission to enforce the related 
mechanism. Strangely enough, after this declaration, 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the 
Polish and Hungarian governing parties were ready to 
vote for her, despite the fact that their countries have 
been the primary targets of said mechanism. This shows 
that the future Commission President’s remarks could 
be – and indeed have been – understood in different 
ways. Furthermore, it shows that the interpretation of 
the rule of law and its possible handling vary. If von der 
Leyen seeks achievements in this field, she must balance 
the instruments available to the Commission against 
the political will of the member states, avoiding an 
4overstretching of the Commission’s competence while 
still influencing the procedure within its clout.
The challenge will be unavoidable. The rule of law 
question will most likely become a central issue for the EU 
institutions and (some) member states during the tenure 
of the von der Leyen Commission. However, this central 
topic stems from reasons other than generally envisaged. 
The issue is far from the simplistic conceptualisation of 
an ‘Orbán question’ or ‘Kaczyński question’. The gist of 
the topic is different: the once ‘technical’ EU has become 
largely politicised, and the rule of law question turns out 
to be one of the central elements of this transformation. 
The issue is far from the simplistic 
conceptualisation of an ‘Orbán question’  
or ‘Kaczyński question’. The gist of the 
topic is different.
For decades, cases of breaches of EU Treaties usually 
related to the circumstance that individual member 
states did not (fully) adhere to Community law, so the 
Commission – referring to the EU acquis – launched 
legal infringement procedures against them. In recent 
years, we have witnessed a new development: member 
states are increasingly questioning, attacking and/or 
ignoring previously agreed common policies, political 
priorities or even principles. 
This can already complicate the implementation – or 
approval – of common political projects of the EU, 
as is the case with migration policy, where member 
states have not been able to bridge their substantial 
differences. Furthermore, the EU enters a total grey zone 
when the debate concerns internal changes within the 
member states related to media law, judiciary reform 
or constitutional amendments. These territories are 
regulated a priori by national constitutions, which 
certainly cannot contradict EU laws and fundamental 
principles enshrined in the EU Treaties. However, the 
possible degree of deviations from the latter is not really 
specified, either.
Those who dispute the concrete interpretation of the 
rule of law sail in uncharted waters: there is no clear 
guidance given by the acquis for them, only vaguely 
defined legal provisions or mechanisms. The challenge 
is clearly political – sometimes even ideological – and 
not ‘only’ legal, so the involved players must improvise 
political arguments, create political coalitions and impose 
political will.
Jarosław  Kaczyński, Viktor Orbán or Matteo Salvini 
(while he had the power to do so) clearly understood that 
the EU had hardly any effective instrument or sanction 
mechanism to stop them from contradicting common 
political directions, and even less to hamper their internal 
agendas aimed at changing their countries’ political and 
institutional landscapes. 
This is not new. The EU has been coping with different 
kinds of political ‘noise’ for decades, ever since 
Eurosceptic parties found their way into the European 
Parliament. MEPs from the French National Front 
(renamed National Rally), the Dutch Party for Freedom 
or the British UK Independence Party have been ready to 
criticise ‘mainstream EU’ harshly from within the Union 
for a long time.
What is new is that these voices are finally speaking 
and operating at the EU’s highest political level; 
from around the European Council table, where a 
radically different position could be a sovereign member 
state’s argument and not merely the opinion of a small 
political fraction.
An incomplete and overrated mechanism
The rule of law question appears in this context. Some 
argue that it is purely in the competence of member 
states to decide how to change and/or amend their 
national constitution, how their judiciary system should 
look and function, and what communication methods 
the government uses at home. Others disagree, recalling 
that being part of a community of law – including, 
among others, a strictly regulated internal market – 
means that no one plays on their lonesome. One’s steps 
can trample on others’ feet, and the common playing 
field more generally.
One thing is certain: different member states’ 
interpretations of the rule of law can have multiple 
consequences. If a decision breaches the acquis, it 
can illicit a reaction from the European Commission, 
as in the case of Hungarian media law whereby they 
identified three concrete and questionable points. It 
can also lead to political reactions from the European 
Parliament, based on party solidarity or simple personal 
convictions, as it was exemplified in different internal 
changes in Poland, Hungary and Romania. Or it can 
provoke disputes between member states, especially if 
a government fears that, for example, illiberal policies 
will affect domestic political developments negatively. 
Take the case of France, where President Emmanuel 
Macron keeps an eye on National Rally’s Marine Le Pen 
and her supporters when commenting on and reacting to 
Hungary’s internal developments.
5Different interpretations of the rule of law can also 
create ideological discrepancies among players. The 
Hungarian prime minister advocates illiberalism, his 
Polish colleague praises the central role of the Church 
and Christian faith, while Marine Le Pen described 
the former Italian government’s priorities as building 
blocks for the “Europe of tomorrow”.2 These are open 
ideological challenges to the positions and principles 
advocated by the so-called European mainstream. 
The Commission’s rule of law mechanism 
is not formally shared across the other 
EU institutions, and when it comes to its 
endgame of launching Article 7 of the  
TEU, it has a hybrid nature.
These challenges can hardly be answered by 
legal procedures solely. As for domestic changes 
(to constitutions or internal institutional settings), 
the Commission’s rule of law mechanism attempts to 
monitor and evaluate domestic situations, forming 
an official opinion if it sees discrepancies, and issuing 
formal warnings and launching legal procedures when 
necessary. However, the mechanism has two faults: it 
is not formally shared across the other EU institutions, 
and when it comes to its endgame of launching Article 
7 of the TEU, it has a hybrid nature. When it refers to 
Article 2 of the Preamble of the TEU and acts according 
to Article 7, the mechanism is based on legal starting 
points – but the follow-up largely takes place on 
political and thus to some extent subjective ground. Its 
possible completion in practice also rests on a political 
decision, which then produces legal consequences. This 
can even include the suspension of voting rights in the 
Council in extreme cases. 
This is precisely what has occurred in the two Article 
7 TEU procedures against Poland and Hungary 
respectively, and which are both now stuck in a deadend. 
The former was formally launched by the Commission 
on 20 December 2017.3 The latter was initiated by the 
European Parliament on 12 September 2018, when 
the plenary voted on Dutch MEP Judith Sargentini’s 
report on the situation of the rule of law in Hungary.4 
The Parliament asked the member states to determine 
whether Hungary is at risk of breaching the Union’s 
founding values. 
Both initiatives were sent to the European Council long 
before the latter started dealing with them, but even 
then, the member states have refrained from taking 
any decision to date. Their reluctance makes clear 
that they are hesitant to go all the way, recognising 
that beyond a certain point, this is based on political 
opinions and the will of the political majority rather 
than clear-cut common rules. Governments are also 
wary of creating a precedent of this kind of procedure, 
fearing that another political majority might use similar 
mechanisms against them in the future. And last but not 
least, there are those in the Council who are opposed 
to the whole procedure, like the current Polish and 
Hungarian governments.
The inability to reach any formal decision speaks 
for itself, especially in the Polish case which started 
almost two years ago. This failure demonstrates that 
the present rule of law mechanism has been designed 
superficially. Those who created it did not really take 
all of the possible consequences into account. It has 
alienated the targeted countries without achieving any 
real change in their conduct. Conversely, the procedure 
has produced an uneasy situation for a European 
Council that does not want to take sole responsibility for 
the reasons mentioned above, and yet must in order to 
not lose face. 
The present rule of law mechanism has 
been designed superficially. Those who 
created it did not really take all of the 
possible consequences into account. It has 
alienated the targeted countries without 
achieving any real change in their conduct.
When the rule of law mechanism was announced in 
March 2014,5 the European Commission’s underlying 
intention was to create something in between the so-
called nuclear option under Article 7 TEU and a simple 
notification of some irregularity in a given member 
state. Yet in reality, despite the Commission’s claims, 
the mechanism was everything but new and far from 
an ‘overall’ instrument for the EU institutions. The 
Commission has simply labelled impressive titles to 
each of its steps, which it takes in any case as logical 
phases of a working procedure. As the Guardian of the 
Treaties, the Commission is always bound to monitor, 
evaluate, question and warn member states before 
initiating legal remedies and infringement procedures.
In other words, former Commissioner Viviane Reding 
(and her then-boss, former President José Manuel 
Barroso) presented a mechanism in early 2014 under 
which each step of a rule of law issue – usually simple 
working phases of a routine procedure – was identified 
meaningfully. Asking for information to put public 
pressure on a ‘suspect’ of a rule of law breach early 
on became known as the ‘rule of law inquiry’. The 
Commission’s opinion was called the ‘rule of law 
evaluation’. The demand for a change in the member 
state’s conduct was named the ‘rule of law proposal’, and 
so on. And voilá, the rule of law mechanism was born.
6It was as much a communications bluff on the 
Commission side as it was a misleading political 
show played by the Polish government to call the 
Commission’s mechanism unlawful in 2016, claiming 
that it does not have Treaty-based legal foundation 
and thus does not exist in reality. This was an obvious 
misinterpretation of the fact that the Commission just 
dressed up the steps fancifully. Politically disturbing 
perhaps, but legally not forbidden. The College does 
have the Treaty-based mandate to monitor, evaluate, 
warn and even start a legal procedure if they deem it 
necessary to defend the content and spirit of the Treaty.
By creating this mechanism, the 
Commission sought to place the countries 
it viewed as breaching certain commonly 
agreed principles and values under public 
pressure. However, it has fallen into its 
own trap.
Originally, by creating this mechanism, the Commission 
sought to place the countries it viewed as breaching 
certain commonly agreed principles and values under 
public pressure. However, it has fallen into its own trap, 
as it could not retreat any further by using such strong 
labels. And if the targeted country did not react to the 
rule of law evaluation (let alone the proposal) – as the 
Polish government was sometimes reluctant to do – then 
the Commission was bound to move one step further to 
not lose credibility.
As a result, in the end, it was the College and not the 
member states that was following a predetermined 
path. This did not serve the Commission’s interests 
and also missed its original goal of failing to influence 
the targeted country at an early stage and avoiding 
triggering the so-called nuclear option.
Still, one must give some credit to Reding and Barroso, 
given that their proposal for the original mechanism 
would have relied on several bodies and not just the 
Commission. All of the relevant Community institutions 
were to be treated as equally important participants. A 
majority in the European Parliament were keen to join, 
but the Council rejected the (original) proposal. So, 
at the end of the day, the ‘new’ instrument – which is 
clearly the old one with new rhetoric enforced – formally 
remained a Commission mechanism solely.
Reaching the end of its mandate, the Barroso 
Commission did not have the time to test out the 
mechanism itself. Under growing pressure from the 
Parliament, former Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s College could not avoid doing so. They hoped 
that thanks to a strong alliance with the Parliament and 
public backing, the ‘new’ mechanism would succeed 
with flying colours. Unfortunately, their calculations 
were completely off: it soon became clear that any 
pressure from Swedish, Dutch or even German audiences 
would not impress the Polish government as long as 
the majority of its public supported it. A substantial 
part of Polish society feels that their living standard has 
improved and appreciates the government’s effort to 
‘defend Poland against Brussels’, as it was said by many 
of those who voted for the present government during 
the latest parliamentary election.
In this sense, the Commission has failed: (sporadic) 
public support may occasionally impress political players 
while they are forging their decision, but it cannot replace 
missing legal bases. And the ‘Barroso mechanism’ – which 
the Juncker Commission inherited – did not have any 
enhanced legal base that would enable it to be considered 
a complete EU rule of law mechanism.  
Two points became immediately evident: 
it would be the next Commission’s task to 
consolidate and implement the new ideas; 
while it must expect strong resistance from 
several member states.
The Juncker Commission made substantial efforts 
to refine the mechanism throughout its mandate, 
adding new elements to it. In its communication 
presented in July 2019, the Commission proposed 
several new additions, including annual rule of law 
reports on all member states, possible sanctions against 
those who breach the common norms, and yearly 
conferences dedicated to the issue in order to “enforce 
the rule of law” all over the Union.6 The long-floated 
idea of establishing a potential link between rule of law 
performance and the right to access the Community’s 
financial support has also been confirmed as a possible 
instrument within the proposal for the upcoming 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), published by 
the European Commission in May 2018.7
Two points became immediately evident: it would be the 
next Commission’s task to consolidate and implement 
the new ideas; while it must expect strong resistance 
from several member states, and certainly including 
those that are currently subject to the ongoing rule 
of law procedures. Hungary’s Minister of Justice Judit 
Varga, who is also responsible for EU affairs, clearly 
stated in July 2019, after the Commission presented its 
proposal, that the initiative lacked any legal base. She 
continued to argue that it could become a dangerous 
political instrument in the future. According to the 
Minister, national and constitutional traditions and 
specifics should be considered first and foremost, and 
7existing mechanisms and instruments should be  
used more efficiently instead of fabricating new ones.8 
In this respect, the Polish position is identical to the 
Hungarian one.
Balancing between legal basis and political will
The principal lesson that one can learn from this 
situation is that no rule of law mechanism can function 
effectively on legal grounds alone as long as the existing 
Treaty foundations remain ambiguous and the final 
decision is taken at the political level, where the Guardian 
of the Treaties is not the decisive player. The Treaty gave 
the Commission the right of notification and initiation, 
while judgement and decision are left solely to the 
member states. The former acts according to the general 
provisions of the Treaty. National governments usually 
consider the legal foundations, too, but follow their own 
political priorities and interests mostly. 
In fact, in rule of law cases, member states revert to the 
creation of the Common Market and decide according 
to their national preferences. For the founding member 
states – and later for those who joined afterwards – it 
seemed evident that the community should only be 
comprised of countries that shared a common vision, 
for example on the market economy or the liberal 
interpretation of the rule of law model. That was their 
ground when they refused the approach of Franco’s 
Spain or Salazar’s Portugal, and it was from this same 
ground that they were ready to open their doors once the 
necessary political changes were completed. Both were 
clearly political decisions.  
The principal lesson that one can learn 
from this situation is that no rule of law 
mechanism can function effectively on 
legal grounds alone as long as the existing 
Treaty foundations remain ambiguous  
and the final decision is taken at the 
political level.
For the same reason, when certain member states 
declare today that democracies should not be liberal 
in a ‘traditional’ sense but rather illiberal, Christian-
national or the like, it represents a conflicting 
political view. Or a different approach to the common 
project rather than a direct breach of the legal acquis – 
even if the acquis originally aimed to guarantee formerly 
agreed political values through legal means. Nevertheless, 
given that the founding members did not wish to become 
a common statehood with a common constitutional 
setting, the legal specification remained superficial, 
offering only a relatively fragile basis for the legal 
denial of altering interpretations. 
Either the legal foundations for any final 
legal judgement should be sufficiently 
detailed in rule of law cases; or the 
political nature of the question should 
be openly declared, thereby inviting all 
political players to participate, draw 
conclusions and decide according to their 
respective political priorities.
This is from where the legal uncertainty stems. The most 
frequently cited paragraph of the Preamble of the TEU 
declares that only the rule of law should prevail – but 
it does not offer any concrete way to achieve this.9 In 
other words, it is clear what the preferred values and 
its intentions are, but the same cannot be said for how 
to defend them. Ever since the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights become part of the Treaty, there is a more detailed 
list of basic rights – nevertheless, it still does not offer an 
elaborated description of their implementation. 
All of this leaves plenty of room for interpretation 
by the member states. For example, to defend the 
reform of their judicial system, Hungarian politicians 
recently pointed to the Finnish justice system which 
has no independent constitutional court. Its functions 
are to a large extent carried out by the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament, and the president 
of the state nominates judges based on proposals by the 
justice minister and a nominating body. According to the 
Hungarian argument, if the ‘Finnish interpretation’ of 
Article 2 can assure the primacy of the rule of law in the 
eyes of many, then why not the Hungarian? The Polish 
and Hungarian governments maintain their argument 
that their legal systems are duly guaranteeing the 
primacy of the rule of law, albeit in a way that is in line 
with their specific constitutional settings and national 
traditions. They tend to refer to Article 4 of the Preamble 
of the TEU,10 which underlines the need for the Union to 
respect the member states’ constitutions.11
In light of this situation, the solution looks simple in 
theory but is actually difficult in practice. In theory, 
either the legal foundations for any final legal judgement 
8should be sufficiently detailed in rule of law cases; or 
the political nature of the question should be openly 
declared, thereby inviting all political players to 
participate, draw conclusions and decide according to 
their respective political priorities. 
In reality, neither of these two options can 
materialise alone. Hypothetically, one might be able to 
create some universal constitutional frame for sovereign 
national states – forcing a one-size-fits-all institutional 
setting and a legally binding unique interpretation of 
the basic laws on to them – but only if and when the 
EU becomes a single federal entity that is based on a 
single constitution, complete with all of its legal and 
institutional consequences. 
The other extreme would be even less realistic: one state’s 
political judgement on another’s national politics without 
a mutually agreed legal base would be seen as an insult 
and interference in domestic affairs. Which, within a 
short period, would escalate harsh political feuds among 
member states, thus fatally eroding the common ground 
for further cooperation. 
Taking all of this into account, in principle, the 
present dual (i.e. partly legal, partly political) system 
offers a quite realistic framework as it represents 
the hybrid nature of the Union. This means that 
it is simultaneously a community with a legally 
operational and enforceable common rule book, and 
an intergovernmental entity of sovereign states where 
decisions are to a large extent based on the political 
readiness and priorities of its constituent elements (i.e. 
the member states represented by national governments 
in the Council). 
A narrow path to follow for the new Commission
Given these circumstances, what can President Ursula  
von der Leyen and her Commission do if they wish to 
enforce the primacy of the rule of law further across the 
Union? The most important step is to find a new balance 
between the legal and political sides of the procedure, 
correctly judging the internal position the Commission 
is to take. A new balance that does not abandon the basic 
aim of protecting the rule of law offers more flexibility 
and draws all of the participants into the game. 
The most important step is to find a new 
balance between the legal and political 
sides of the procedure, correctly judging 
the internal position the Commission  
is to take.
To move into this direction, the following steps should 
be taken:
q Facing the mentioned hybrid system, President 
von der Leyen should resist pretending that her 
College is the key to solving national challenges 
to the rule of law. This is impossible given that the 
Commission is not the decisive political player. The 
von der Leyen Commission should be more humble, 
warn member states whenever it identifies threats 
to the rule of law in individual member states, and 
even launch infringement procedures on concrete 
matters if the case is within the scope of the College. 
It should not pretend that it can judge and sanction 
the guilty party of general rule of law cases. This is 
why Poland and Hungary became so hostile against 
the Juncker Commission during their procedures. 
The new Commission must be more diplomatic to 
not burn bridges between Brussels and certain parts 
of the Union. Von der Leyen’s first gestures clearly 
showed that she understands this and is ready to 
overcome the existing stalemates, which is important 
if she intends to influence the dynamism and 
direction of the member states’ participation – and 
their interaction – in the process. 
q The Commission’s situation is special. It is formally 
the Guardian of the Treaties, thus its basic mandate 
is strongly anchored in protecting the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, if it wishes to cooperate with all 
member states, then it cannot just serve one part 
of the Community, even if it believes that certain 
member states are more in line with the letter and 
spirit of the Treaty than others. Again, this is why 
the Polish and Hungarian governments were so 
upset with the Juncker Commission: in their view 
and wording, Brussels served the ‘old-fashioned’ and 
‘outdated’ part of the Union – meaning the ‘liberal 
minded Old West’ – and not the whole Community.  
 The argument of the criticised member(s) also 
has its own logic and represents real interests and 
public support. Furthermore, the present cases 
have substantial public support, too. Perhaps their 
conviction seems of a different world, but as long as 
that world is also formally part of the Community, 
their reasoning merits attention, analysis and 
understanding (though not necessarily approval). If 
they are ignored and/or refused automatically, 
then the chance of any dialogue occurring 
between Community members is bound to 
disappear, and only the opposing camps’ fighting 
relationship will remain for all of time.
9q The warning system itself could be improved. 
As mentioned earlier, the Juncker Commission did 
initiate a more sophisticated monitoring and warning 
system. The new Commission has declared to be ready 
to continue this process, even though the mechanism 
would always be subject to certain limitations. These 
improvements should also target the role of the 
Council. The Commission could propose a reform of 
the current instrument by targeting a more detailed 
procedural scheme to the Council, elaborating the 
implementation of Article 7 procedure further and 
setting deadlines (e.g. for the consecutive phases). 
This kind of change could add pressure on the Council 
and provide the Commission with the legal pretext to 
turn to the European Court of Juctice if the procedure 
evolves too slowly on the Council side.
The Commission could propose a reform  
of the current instrument by targeting a 
more detailed procedural scheme to the 
Council, elaborating the implementation 
of Article 7 procedure further and  
setting deadlines.
q The desire to ‘sanction’ member states which 
seemingly breach an important aspect of the rule of 
law is understandable – but it must also be realistic. In 
this respect, it may be wiser to stick to procedures 
that can be implemented in reality to ensure 
concrete results. 
 For example, the idea of introducing a general 
‘rule of law conditionality’ for the use of EU funds 
in the next MFF may look attractive in the eyes of 
many, but would it actually pass? Hardly, as the 
MFF is to be agreed by consensus and will never be 
approved by the targeted countries (regardless of 
whether the conditionality is within the framework 
of the future MFF or is a parallel mechanism). Is it 
worth spending so much time and political capital 
to force this conditionality? Especially considering 
how even if it were somehow finally introduced, it 
could easily backfire due to the public of the target 
country denouncing Brussels for ‘taking our money’. 
An alternative might be to consider positive 
financial stimuli, where additional sources and 
instruments are made available to those who are 
ready to follow a certain common scheme. 
q The final aim should be decided in advance. Should it 
be to defend values or make a member state change 
its conduct? In an optimal case, it would be both. It 
may be useful, however, to remember that the present 
Article 7 procedures generally have not weakened 
but actually strengthened the targeted governments’ 
position on their domestic field. For example, during 
the recent parliamentary election in Poland, the 
governing Law and Justice party won easily. 
Forcing Article 7 under premature 
circumstances – which includes the 
absence of Council support – could  
serve as a political demonstration, but  
can also compromise the credibility  
of the instrument itself.
 It is advisable also to remember that, in the end, 
it is up to the member states to decide. And in the 
eyes of the Council, sanctioning a sovereign state 
by depriving it of its voting right is serious as it 
alienates the overwhelming majority, so the reason 
behind such a move must be very specific and 
convincing. If it is not the case then any meaningful 
step is improbable at the European Council level. 
Not to mention that the final decision could be 
easily blocked by forging some counter-alliance. For 
instance, it is common knowledge that Hungary will 
never vote against Poland, and vice versa. Forcing 
Article 7 under premature circumstances – which 
includes the absence of Council support – could 
serve as a political demonstration, but can also 
compromise the credibility of the instrument itself if 
there are no substantial consequences. 
q If the root of the rule of law question is 
primarily political, then one must face the fact 
that political disagreement is to be answered 
by political means – if at all. Certainly, those who 
decide to follow this road must be prepared for 
a less predictable world, where the common rule 
counts less and the political more. The political 
decision of the pro-EU parties in the new European 
Parliament to establish a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around 
the EU-sceptic and extremist parties – voting out 
their candidates from any committee chair contest 
– was for example political. This kind of action is 
a doubtlessly radical and sometimes dangerous 
instrument, as it can fatally erode the foundation of 
the common rules and initiate endless feuds between 
opposing parties. 
 An alternative, especially for when political 
differences increase (e.g. regarding the speed and 
direction of further integration, the interpretation 
of the rule of law, the preferred form of democracy) 
could be to accelerate the deepening of 
cooperation among like-minded and willing 
member states, leaving behind those who 
increasingly seem to be mere stumbling blocks and 
uneasy bullies. Such increased levels of cooperation 
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among groups of EU countries could create different 
forms of differentiated integration (e.g. launching 
‘enhanced Schengen cooperation’ in relation to 
migration policy). Some say that this is highly 
improbable at present as there are even many 
conflicting issues among the like-minded member 
states, which could result in divergence instead of 
closer cooperation. Indeed, the present conflictive 
situation (i.e. the MFF debate) is hardly the basis 
for any proactive acceleration. Nevertheless, the 
reflex itself can also be defensive. 
 The founding member states – the original six plus 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and even Scandinavia – have 
special relations with the Common Market and the 
ongoing EU integration. They have invested heavily in 
the project for decades through several generations. 
For them, the EU means interrelated institutional 
networks, interdependent business relations, mutual 
economic ties, common security and strategic 
interests, which translate into all kinds of trade or 
financial cooperation for firms, free movement for 
employers and passport-free travel for all. In other 
words, they have a lot to lose if the EU project fails, 
or if the political and social model evaporates from 
below their feet. The original project was built on the 
grounds of rules-based open societies, open markets, 
open international relations and so on. In order to 
avoid this, the like-minded group could feel obliged 
to deepen and accelerate cooperation at a certain 
moment, as they did during the euro crisis.
The founding member states have a lot  
to lose if the EU project fails, or if the 
political and social model evaporates  
from below their feet.
Conclusion
One thing is sure: the rule of law question will not 
disappear, if only because the diverging interpretations 
outlined are bound to persist. The Polish and Hungarian 
governments will remain in power for years. Czech, Croat 
and some Romanian leaders seem impressed and ready 
to follow the paths Kaczyński and Orbán have paved, and 
who knows who else will join this group. Italy might not 
have seen the last of Matteo Salvini, for example.
The new Commission will be confronted with a difficult 
choice: it can either try to live with all of the formal 
members of the Union, listening to and mediating 
between them, while continuing to defend the rules 
and values that were trusted to it as the Guardian of 
the Treaty. Alternatively, it can lead an open political 
fight against those who seem to weaken the previously 
agreed interpretation of fundamental European rules 
and principles, which are still shared by many but 
reinterpreted by others.
The first option gives preference to unity, attempts to 
heal wounds and assures a common playing ground for 
everyone while maintaining principles and doing what 
its mandate allows it to do. The second option is a 
declaration of a division within the Community, with 
the College also taking a side.
However, in theory, there is also a third option. While 
not giving up on unity, likeminded and willing EU 
countries could intensify their level of cooperation 
by leaving others behind, while formally retaining all 
parties within the framework of a larger (and looser) 
Community. 
In any case, the determining factor is the path the 
majority of member states choose to follow. The rule  
of law debate is bound to continue, and the name of the 
game remains the future shape of the European Union.
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